In the early morning hours of January 3rd, U.S. forces deployed into Venezuela to capture the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro, and extricate him and his wife, Cilia Flores, from Venezuela to the United States to face criminal drug trafficking charges. The combined military and law enforcement operation has both been characterized as a criminal and a necessary act. The success of the military action by the U.S. against Venezuela has profound implications for Latin America, because of Donald Trump’s continued threats against Greenland, México and the other countries.
Table of Contents
Operation Absolute Resolve
Operation Just Cause
The Greenland Scenario
The Mexican Scenario
In Summa
Although oil has been posited as the reason behind the removal of Maduro, the official reason remains fighting narco-terrorism. Speculation as to the reasons and the legality of Maduro’s removal from Venezuela will continue for some time. Reactions to Trump’s unilateral decision to intervene militarily in Venezuela has led to mixed reactions from Latin America with right-wing leaders generally supporting it while other Latin American leaders fear it as another Roosevelt Corollary.
President Theodore Roosevelt – coincidently prompted by the 1902 Venezuelan foreign debt default – delivered a message to Congress on December 6, 1904, arguing that America’s foreign policy allowed it to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American countries as part of the Monroe Doctrine’s purpose of keeping European powers out of the continent. He argued that “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence,” of a “civilized society” may force the U.S. to act as “an international police power.” Roosevelt added that “in asserting the Monroe Doctrine,” regarding Cuba, Venezuela and Panama, the U.S. had “acted in our own best interest as well as the interest of humanity at large.” During the 1902 Venezuelan Debt Crisis, Britain, Germany and Italy blockaded Venezuela to force it to pay back its loans to them. Roosevelt, invoking the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine forced the three European countries to settle the debt through arbitration to end the blockade. In the 1900’s Cuba became a U.S. protectorate under the Platt Amendment. The Platt Amendment allowed the U.S. extensive control over Cuba’s affairs to keep European influence at bay. Several treaties in the 1900s also provided the U.S. with control to build, operate and defend the Panama Canal.
The Roosevelt Corollary set the precedent for the removal of Maduro through U.S. military force based on the argument that the U.S. can choose to unilaterally protect its interests. Although the Monroe Doctrine was intended to keep European powers out of the Americas, its evolution from its defensive principal towards allowing America unilateral intervention in Latin American countries has made it controversial in South America.
Recent political ideological changes in South America has led to a divided approach to America’s recent intervention in Venezuela.
Argentina’s President Javier Milei, Chile’s President-elect José Kast, and Ecuador’s President, Daniel Noboa generally support Trump’s ouster of Maduro. On the other side of the political spectrum, presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil), Gabriel Boric (Chile), Gustavo Petro (Colombia), and Claudia Sheinbaum (México) labeled Trump’s actions as American bullying.
The rest of the Latin American leaders have generally remained quiet about the operation or issued lukewarm responses to it, leaving Latin America divided against Trump’s Venezuelan incursion.
Six days after the military intervention, Venezuela’s oil and who controls the country remain largely unchanged. Maduro pleaded not guilty in federal court. Former Venezuelan Vice-president Delcy Rodríguez is now president of the country and is seemingly supported by Trump. Rodríguez leaves intact the Maduro regime while being careful to appoint new government officials palatable to Washington while pretending that Venezuela’s oil would start to flow to Washington soon, as Trump has indicated. Rodríguez seems to be tiptoeing around, keeping both the regime’s hardliners and Trump at bay by not addressing directly the issue of oil. Absent from the news is narco-drug trafficking continuing to emanating from Venezuela.
With “colectivos,” the Chavista armed paramilitary groups, patrolling Venezuelan streets both indicates that Maduro’s political apparatus remains intact, and drug trafficking remains unabated. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has already dropped claims that the Cártel de los Soles is an organized criminal group.
Cártel de los Soles
The original March 5, 2020, indictment against Maduro accused him and others of participating in a “corrupt and violent narco-terrorism conspiracy” that included the Cártel de los Soles. The 2020 indictment defined the Cártel de los Soles as “a Venezuelan drug-trafficking organization.”
On November 24, 2025, the U.S. Department of State designated the Cártel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, naming Maduro as the head of the organization.
However, the December 23, 2025, indictment used to charge Maduro earlier this week now refers to the Cártel de los Soles as “a patronage system,” instead of a drug organization.
Relegating the Cártel de los Soles as a mere “patronage system” leaves open the question of what effect, if any, will the removal Maduro have on the drug trade centered in Venezuela when the colectivos and the Chavista movement remain intact today. Adding to the drama is Venezuela’s new president, leftist and Chavista Delcy Rodríguez who stated on Wednesday that there is no foreign government governing Venezuela even though Trump has said he “asserts control” over the country.
Against the backdrop of who controls Venezuela today, whether Maduro’s removal curtails drugs into the US, or if Chavismo is dead remains the question of whether Trump will deploy the U.S. military against Greenland or México.
It is important to understand that U.S. forces have demonstrated the ability to operate in any Latin American country without meeting effective resistance in a highly targeted operation with a specific goal like spiriting a country’s leader out of the country and delivering them to the U.S. It is entirely a different scenario if Trump were to choose regime change or the limited occupation of a country in most Latin American countries because of the military resources such action would place on the U.S. military.
To understand how the dynamics for both Greenland and México have swiftly changed it is important to understand Operation Absolute Resolve and how it cements the new military dynamic that America no longer needs to deploy traditional military doctrines to force change in any Latin American country. America has demonstrated that it can snatch a country’s leader and remove them from power within hours of starting military operations. Latin American countries now must confront the reality that they are ill-equipped to respond to American military incursions into their countries.
Operation Absolute Resolve
On January 3, 2026, the U.S. military launched a successful highly coordinated joint operation combining long-range air power, precision strikes, cyber and space capabilities, special operations, and joint interagency assets to isolate, and capture the sitting president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro. The operation reportedly involving more than 150 American aircraft that neutralized Venezuela’s Russian supplied air defense systems in and around Caracas without the loss of an American aircraft. The U.S. military was able to operate in Venezuela with impunity. An American rapid reaction force captured Maduro and his wife and removed them from Venezuela with little resistance from Venezuelan military forces.
The operation first achieved air dominance over Caracas to limit Venezuelan air assets from intervening. This was achieved with a combination of neutralizing air defense systems through cyber/electronic-attacks and fighter bombers. Targeted bombing on military command centers neutralized Venezuela’s ability to coordinate a defense against the fast-moving American military operation.
After neutralizing Venezuela’s capability to defend the Caracas target area, U.S. Delta Force operators executed a rapid seizure of Maduro and his wife and exfiltrated them out of Venezuela using helicopters and naval assets.
The operation to capture Maduro and remove him from Venezuela was completed in hours before Venezuelan military forces could react to the U.S. invasion. Venezuelan resistance to the U.S. incursion was largely nonexistent until U.S. military forces closed on the compound where they found Maduro. Venezuelan defensive positions in Maduro’s compound opened fire resulting in the lead Chinook helicopter pilot being injured before U.S. forces could use suppression fire to stop them. U.S. officials have reported seven U.S. military personnel were injured in the operation. Venezuelan authorities have reported around 100 casualties in the U.S. operation, including 32 Cuban intelligence and military members. The Cubans were mostly operating as bodyguards for Maduro.
What is important to note about the American incursion into Venezuela is the limited scope of the operation. Its only goal was to remove Maduro. The battlespace was limited to Caracas in the northern part of Venezuela. The targets for the military force were limited to creating a corridor for the extraction helicopters to locate, capture and remove Maduro.
The Americans limited its targets to those directly protecting the teams removing Maduro leaving Venezuela’s military infrastructure generally unmolested. For example, Venezuelan naval ships in the area were not targeted and the La Corta Air Base, part of the Venezuelan air force headquarters, was not engaged during the operation. It appears to be a deliberate attempt to let the Venezuelan military know that Maduro was the target and not them.
The success of the operation is now the blueprint for the future use of U.S. military force in countries south of the U.S. border and possibly in Greenland. The Multi-Domain Integration deployed in Operation Absolute Resolve combined air, cyber, land, maritime and special forces into a high-precision leadership decapitation battlespace where local defensive positions are effectively neutralized before they could respond.
This is the blueprint for future operations against obstinate South American nations and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).
The U.S. military operation against Venezuela, although framed as a law enforcement operation, is a paradigm shift where the American government unilaterally targeted a head of state without United Nations (UN) authority, putting nations on notice that U.S. is now willing to act militarily against them with impunity.
Operation Absolute Resolve shows that the United States will use military force unilaterally to achieve strategic political objectives irrespective of legal frameworks and external political pressures.
Although questions remain as to the effectiveness of the removal of Maduro in terms of long-term political objectives for the American state, a similar operation in the 1990s provides a glimpse as to the possible implications for other Latin American interventions by the Trump administration during the rest of his second term.
Operation Just Cause
The 1989-1990 Operation Just Cause launched by the George H. Bush administration in late December 1989 removed Manuel Noriega as the ruler of Panama and put him on trial on drug trafficking charges. On December 20, 1989, the U.S. began its invasion of Panama.
Operation Just Cause’s objective was to remove Noriega and put him on trial in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. Secondary objectives included protecting U.S. citizens in Panama and the canal, as well restoring democracy in the country.
The Venezuelan operation likewise sought to remove Maduro, put him on trial for drug trafficking and protect American interests.
The operational scale of both operations is large. For the Panama invasion, the U.S. deployed 26,000 troops targeting around 24 locations in Panama. It was the largest U.S. combat deployment since Vietnam.
While Operation Just Cause deployed boots on the ground, the Venezuelan operation, also large, targeted a specific location to detain Maduro through a technology-heavy precise and rapid operation that used coordinated cyber warfare, air operations and special forces. The Panamanian operation resulted in the death of around 600 Panamanians although there remains some controversy over the number of civilian and military killed in that operation.
Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990, after seeking refuge at the Holy See’s diplomatic mission in Panama. Noriega was convicted of drug trafficking and served 17 years in prison. In 2007, he was released from American custody and extradited to France to face money laundering charges. Although sentenced to seven years in prison by the French courts, Noriega was extradited by France in December 2011 to serve murder charges in Panama lodged against him while he was in prison in the U.S. Noriega died in 2017 while still in Panamanian custody.
Today, Maduro and his wife are incarcerated in the United States awaiting trial on the drug charges, while Venezuela’s regime – that supported Maduro – remains intact.
Similarities between Noriega and Maduro are now starting to surface. In 1992, in United States v. Noriega (S.D. Fla. 1992), the court ruled that “Noriega is in fact a prisoner of war as defined by Geneva III, and as such must be afforded the protections established by the treaty, regardless of the type of thee facility in which the Bureau of Prisons chooses to incarcerate him.”
Noriega became the longest held prisoner of war in the U.S. As a recognized POW, Noriega enjoyed mail privileges and monthly relief parcels that other convicted federal felons did not have. Most important, Noriega was granted standards that included protections against physical abuse, daily exercise and overall better conditions than the other inmates.
Maduro has now invoked prisoner of war status in court on Monday. The judge said that the issue of POW status would be dealt with in later hearings.
Both operations used the military for law enforcement purposes blurring the line between law enforcement and military action. Both operations decapitated a country’s leadership, but unlike Panama, the Venezuelan regime remains largely intact, albeit seemingly willing to allow the U.S. some measure of control, including its oil. In both cases, drug trafficking was used as the raison d’état.
Militarily, both operations overwhelmed defense forces through surprise and overwhelming military sophistication to achieve the intended goal before the targeted country could organize a defense.
The key military differences between both operations are the use of ground troops. The Panama operation put around 26,000 troops in Panama, while the Venezuelan operation relied on a surgical strike led by air assets with few boots on the ground. Panama required a large ground force to occupy the country, while the Venezuelan operation has not deployed an occupation force and seems to be relying on pressure to control the regime’s leadership.
It should be noted that the operational terrain for Panama versus Venezuela required different military resources even with advanced technology the U.S. now deploys. Unlike Panama, a small isthmus, Venezuela is a much larger and offers a more complex battlespace with a better equipped military. This likely influenced the decision to use a surgical strike to remove Maduro and allow his regime to keep control of the country.
It is too early to know if the short-term tactical success in removing Maduro will achieve stability and a resurgence of Venezuela. Curiously Chavismo remains in place suggesting that the outcome simply removed a figurehead and replaced it with another one that still represents Chavismo. This is unlike Panama’s relative stability as it transitioned towards civilian rule. Unlike Venezuela, Panama had an existing and legitimate opposition ready to step in.
María Corina Machado, Venezuela’s opposition leader was honored last year with the Noble Peace Prize. Machado and Trump are expected to meet next week. Even though Machado has said that her coalition has the mandate to lead Venezuela after the ouster of Maduro, Trump has said that “it would be very tough” for Machado “to be the leader,” because Machado does not have the “respect” the position requires.
If Machado and Trump were to meet next week, it would be first time since October the two have spoken, suggesting that Trump never took Machado seriously as the future leader for Venezuela.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Trump would support Machado in any capacity as a Venezuelan leader. Current indications are that the White House believes that Delcy Rodríguez is best suited to govern Venezuela post Maduro. Not only that, but the Trump administration is allowing much of the Chavistas to remain in power, including those accused of drug trafficking and human rights violations, including Diosdado Cabello. Cabello controls the colectivos and is an ardent supporter of Maduro, and is also under indictment for drug trafficking. Maduro loyalist and now president of Venezuela, Rodríguez appointed Gustavo González López to replace the ousted leader of the Presidential Guard. González is sanctioned by both the U.S. and the European Union. Also under criminal indictment in the U.S. is Vladimir Padrino who remains as Defense Minister of Venezuela.
By allowing criminally indicted Venezuelan leaders in power, the Trump administration is both hoping to avoid having to put boots on the ground to keep Venezuela from falling into civil war. This is bolstered by Trump’s disdain for opposition leader Machado. But by keeping the Maduro regime in power, especially those criminally indicted in the U.S. signals that the ouster of Maduro was not about regime change but rather about something else, oil.
The Oil Embroglio
Venezuela’s oil reserves are around 17% of the world’s oil supply. The Trump White House has not been quiet about extracting Venezuela’s oil by American oil companies. Even under intensive economic sanctions limiting oil production in Venezuela, American-based Chevron continued to operate under an American license exempting them from the embargo. It remains pumping oil in Venezuela today. ExxonMobile and ConocoPhillips are reluctant to enter the Venezuelan oil industry after the Venezuelan government seized their assets in 2007.
ExxonMobile has said that Venezuela is “an opportunity” to address “the biggest challenge” they have “as a depletion business.” But the oil company cautioned that the “legal and commercial” frameworks currently in Venezuela requires “significant changes” to the oil laws of the country before investment in oil becomes feasible.
In other words, substantial guarantees must be made by the U.S. government to encourage the oil companies to return to Venezuela.
Venezuela’s oil, at best, will take billions of dollars in investment and years to become productive for many reasons, including the current state of the country’s oil producing infrastructure. None of that can begin to happen until changes in Venezuela’s oil laws are changed to protect oil investments from foreign companies. That can only happen with a strong and stable Venezuelan government in place.
Latin America’s response to the U.S. military action in Venezuela remains largely fractured as it did in 1989 with governments either conceding or unable to build a unified response to the removal of a head of state through military force. The only geopolitical difference in the region today is the deeper presence of Chinese and Russian influence in the region.
In the end, Absolute Resolve demonstrated and created the blueprint of using surgical strikes to decapitate leadership – either governmental or criminal. But the operation highlights the complexity of forcing regime change to meet Washington’s foreign policy needs. The Venezuelan regime remains intact but extracting oil is billions of dollars and years away showing that Maduro may have been removed but the goal of democratizing Venezuela remains elusive and stabilizing its economy remains as difficult as it was before Maduro was removed.
But for Greenland and México, Operation Absolute Resolve opens a new and dangerous dynamic in the geopolitics of the Trump administration that continues to threaten both. The U.S. has shown that it will act unilaterally to achieve its political gains without considering legal and worldwide condemnation.
Unlike Venezuela, both Greenland and México are highly vulnerable to surgical strikes to achieve Trump’s goals. The U.S. would face little resistance in effectively taking control of Greenland while México will have little to respond with should the Trump administration decide to target the Sinaloa cartel for its fentanyl business in the U.S.
The Greenland Scenario
The Trump administration has said that Washington will intervene in Greenland “whether they like it or not.” Denmark has rejected Trump’s continued threats to Greenland, but the Venezuelan operation has defined new threats that the international community had not faced before with an unrestrained and belligerent America.
Greenland has strategic value for the U.S. due to its location and military infrastructure left from the Cold War. This is in addition to mineral reserves. Militarily, Denmark’s semi-autonomous land allows the U.S. to monitor Russian naval movements.
Militarily, the U.S. would benefit through strengthening Greenland’s installations for early warning use. Previously, through cooperation within the North American Treaty Organization (NATO), Greenland’s use of early warning was supported by Denmark, the U.S. and NATO allies.
Cooperation was the working framework until the Trump administration started threatening to seize Greenland. Now Denmark, and NATO by extension faces two scenarios. The first is coercion through economic and political pressures. Basically, the U.S. would use economic incentives like investment and infrastructure to build enough influence to get what it wants out of Greenland. This would avoid the need for military use and for the most part keep the Danish government generally unable to effectively counter the movement. But it will take a large investment and time.
Because of the Venezuelan operation’s success and timid international response to it, the Trump administration may feel that global opposition to take control of Greenland will be insufficient and ineffective enough to allow America to control it after the controversy dies down, making a military option more effective than the time it would take to negotiate and raise the investment needed to influence Greenland through economic power.
Arguing that the U.S. must act to keep Chinese and Russian influence out of Greenland, the U.S. could establish territorial control of Greenland, ostensibly for its security with minimal military assets.
Although Denmark has declared that annexing Greenland is unacceptable and likely to cause NATO to fracture, Venezuela demonstrates that threatening global condemnation is insufficient to deter the Trump administration, especially if the global community is fractured in its condemnation like it has been with Venezuela so far.
Although any U.S. military action against Greenland must deal with the region’s harsh conditions and vast territory, Denmark’s limited military presence is ill-equipped to defend the territory, more so than Venezuela was. Nonetheless, an American intervention in Greenland would be politically costly to Trump domestically as many Republicans believe in the mission of NATO.
Although taking control of Greenland is militarily easily achievable, the international backlash may likely lead to a global crisis as NATO would further fracture, countries would further isolate the U.S. and complex environmental and humanitarian issues would limit the benefits America seeks. Europe would seek to build on its defensive autonomy forgoing continued American military interoperability further encouraging China and Russia to increase their global footprints while further weakening the defensive postures of Europe and America.
If the Trump administration believes that it can take control of Greenland with limited global condemnation than it is likely to do so, even if it means empowering Chinese and Russian military expansion across the globe. At the end of day, much will depend on the Republican establishment if they feel that the consequences outweigh the benefits.
Some Republicans, however, at the Senate are supporting legislation requiring the Trump administration to seek Congressional approval before taking further military action in Venezuela. Military activity in Greenland, especially if it is perceived that it would fracture NATO would find more Republicans pushing back on Trump’s use of the military to achieve goals.
Unlike Greenland, México faces another dilemma after Venezuela. The nexus of drug interdiction factors in any decision made towards using military force in México like it did for Panama and Venezuela. Unlike Panama and Venezuela, México does not have a dictator that many countries would support removing. Another immediate factor is that the likely destabilization caused by a uniliteral military operation in México targeting the Sinaloa cartel or other DTOs would severely reduce America’s security on its southern border. Sheinbaum cannot allow a unilateral U.S. military incursion into México for domestic reasons causing the Mexican government to immediately respond economically, politically and even militarily, albeit in limited scope to placate domestic furor over the incursion.
All these events would lead to a disruption of economic trade between the two countries and could easily escalate into chaos on America’s southern border.
The Mexican Scenario
México is the leading trading partner with the United States both in imports and exports. Any disruption of the trade between the two countries would help to destabilize México and poses serious economic and safety threats to the U.S.
The Sinaloa cartel is responsible for large portions of fentanyl entering the U.S. It has been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. government, like the fictional Cártel de los Soles was.
On Wednesday, the Trump administration said that “we are going to now start hitting land with regards to the cartels,” referencing that the cartels “are running Mexico.” Trump added that “Mexico has to get their act together because they’re [fentanyl traffickers] pouring through Mexico and we’re going to have to do something.”
The Mexican government has consistently rejected any unilateral American military operation that violates México’s sovereignty.
After Venezuela, México faces three possible scenarios.
The first one is one is where the U.S. military unilaterally uses precision strikes against the cartel leaderships in México. The goal would be to degrade cartel operations near the U.S.-México border, disrupting fentanyl entry into the country.
Although a military surgical strike seems feasible on the surface it relies on accurate intelligence that provides specific targets where only members of the criminal organization are the casualties. The problem lies in that the DTOs are highly embedded within civilian communities where civilian casualties from military action could result. Civilian casualties are untenable to the Mexican government. Moreover, if the DTOs choose to escalate by attacking U.S. interests in México or the United States, the escalation will easily spiral out of control leading to a military response from México escalating into a limited cross-border conflict. The first casualty would be economic for both countries as cross-border trade would be severely disrupted.
In any case, the Mexican government would be forced to react to any violation of Mexican sovereignty even if it targets cartels only.
Because of the economic threat, a unilateral military action remains somewhat unlikely, although the success of Venezuela may have provided the Trump administration with a false sense of success of a unilateral military incursion into México targeting the drug cartel(s). However, the likely result of an American unilateral military action will not result in any meaningful disruption of drug trafficking and would have no strategic impact on DTO operations.
The second scenario is one in which México agrees to joint operations with the U.S. Under scenario two, Sheinbaum would frame the argument that the Mexican government requested U.S. assistance to help dismantle cartel infrastructure and leadership.
But framing the operation of allowing U.S. military operations are very difficult especially after Trump has signal that he will invade México without the blessing of the Mexican government. Sovereignty is a highly sensitive issue in México and would be exploited by opposition political parties and the criminal organizations making a difficult situation worse.
As with option one, the goal of ending drug trafficking into the U.S. would not be achieved. Instead, further coordination between both governments would become domestically more complicated on both sides of the border. The existing cross border partnerships are at the level that both countries can continue to deploy considering Trump’s continued threats to México’s sovereignty. The Trump administration has made closer collaboration extremely more difficult by threatening to unilaterally act making it more difficult for Sheinbaum to consider.
The third scenario, one in which the U.S. deploys military operations deep in México, similar to Absolute Resolve but targeted at DTO leadership instead of the Mexican leaders will lead to destabilizing México, making things considerably worse for the U.S. in terms of the economy and the controlling the drugs entering the country.
The Mexican government would be forced to treat the military incursion as war and react appropriately. Although militarily, the Mexican military is ill-equipped to confront U.S. forces directly, in an asymmetrical battlespace the U.S. would face a very complicated insurgency involving civilian, military and criminal organizations acting in unison.
The economic disruption and the collapse of the Mexican government would spiral into a dangerous southern border for the U.S. by criminal elements opening opportunities for China and Russia to increase their presence in America’s doorstep. Insurgency and civilian displacement would continue for years, and resentment would last decades, ending any cooperation for years to come.
In Summa: The Question Is Not Whether Trump Would Be Tempted to Unilaterally Launch Against Greenland or México, But Whether The Cost Would Be Too High For The American People
On the surface, America’s removal of Maduro was successful but at what cost? Around 150 air assets were deployed and an untold number of munitions, many of them costly, were expended. Maduro is in the custody in the U.S. awaiting trial, but his regime remains intact in Venezuela. The monetary cost has yet to be calculated. The oil production that can offset the monetary expenditures are years away and costly, assuming that the Venezuelan regime delivers on its promises and that it is able to keep the country stable in the coming months and years.
Although Operation Absolute Resolve has shown that the U.S. can and is willing to act militarily unimpeded and unilaterally the remaining question is whether the monetary costs, not to mention the consequences, are offset by the measurable results.
At the end of the day, the victory, if it can be labeled as such, for the capture of Maduro is only that the henchman and his wife are awaiting trial. Not including the cost of the munitions used in the capture of Maduro and the cost of the air assets and other military equipment, the Trump administration has already spent over $700 million in just blockading Venezuelan oil. When the accounting for Operation Absolute Resolve is quantified, the billions of dollars spent on the operation, the continued military pressures on Venezuela and developing Venezuela’s oil for American consumers may be insufficient to offset the costs to the American taxpayers.
The cost is the likely inflection point for any decision to militarily take over Greenland or target DTOs in México. Even without articulating the cost to capture Maduro, the Republicans in Congress are starting to look at curtailing Trump’s ability to unilaterally deploy military force in other countries. The question, however, for Greenland and México, is will the calculus for attacking either country be considered before Trump takes unilateral action against either.
Cover photo credit: U.S. government photograph of Nicolás Maduro shortly after his capture of U.S. forces on January 3, 2026.
